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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
to inscribed chattels. The general policy here seems to be that the
trial court is allowed a broad discretion in questions of whether sec-
ondary evidence concerning an inscribed chattel is to be admissible as
opposed to a requirement of introduction of the inscribed chattel
itself.' It has been suggested by at least one text writer than the trial
court also be given this broad discretion in factual situations illustrating
the second problem area, e.g., where a party seeks to introduce a
subsequent recording where the original recording has been lost or
destroyed.' One court has held directly contrary to such a suggestion.'
It would seem that an analogy might well be made from the rules
applied in the case of an inscribed chattel, to the situation in the
Lyskoski case.
The Lyskoski case indicates an extension by the Washington court
of the rule regarding photographs to the situation of original and tran-
scribed recordings. However, as pointed out above, this indicated
extension does not constitute a holding on the facts present in the
case. Though this is true, the result reached by the court is altogether
reasonable. It is suggested however, that the two tests set out in
the cases of problem area two be met before such a result is reached.
That is:
1. It should appear that the "secondary" evidence is clearly equal
in probative value to the primary proof, and
2. It should appear that fraud or imposition is not to be reasonably
feared.
GoRDON L. WALGREN
INSURANCE
Insurance-Effect of a Divorce Decree. In United Benefit Life
Insurance Co. v. Price' the Washington court kept alive one more
aspect of the unfortunate doctrine handed down originally in Occiden-
tal Life Insurance Co. v. Powers.' The facts in the case were these:'
6 See, e.g., State v. Lewark, 106 Kan. 184, 186 Pac. 1002 (1920) ; Mattson v. Minn.
& N.W. R. Co., 98 Minn. 296, 108 N.W. 517 (1906).7 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, p. 412, n.5 (1954 ed.).
8 People v. King, 101 Cal. App. 2d 500, 225 P.2d 950 (1950). See criticism of this
case in 64 HARv. L. REV. 1369.
146 Wn.2d 587, 283 P.2d 119 (1955).
2 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937). The errors inherent in this doctrine have not
gone unnoticed by members of the Washington court. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Brock, 41 Wn.2d 369, 249 P.2d 383 (1952), an eight man court was evenly divided on
the question of overruling it completely. See also the dissenting opinion of Mallery, J.,
in Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn.2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947).
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the wife was beneficiary of the policy in question on the life of the
husband, which was conceded to be community property,- having been
taken out during marriage; it had a provision permitting the insured
to change the beneficiary. In contemplation of divorce, the parties
entered into a property settlement agreement, purporting to settle all
their property rights. The settlement, inter alia, awarded to the hus-
band "(a) All insurance policies on the defendant's [husband's] life,"
and "(b) All other property.., free of any claims of the plaintiff [wife]
thereto." The divorce decree approved the property settlement, and
the court copied its language in the decree. The husband kept the
policy in his possession. Although there was some evidence that he
had intended to change the beneficiary from his former wife to his
fiancee, he had not done so at the time of his death, five months and
twenty days after the decree had been rendered.
Both the insured's former wife, the named beneficiary, and his
administrator claimed the proceeds; the insurance company filed an
action of interpleader. The court based its decision, in favor of the
administrator, on the finality of the divorce decree's disposition of the
couple's property, saying that, as the statute' requires that all property
of the parties be disposed of upon divorce, the superior court must
have included the proceeds of the policy in the decree. The wife was
"divested of any interest she might have had as the beneficiary under
the insurance policy conceded to be community property and awarded
to the husband."'
This decision is based upon the approach taken in the Powers case
which failed to recognize any distinction between the present rights of
ownership in a policy of life insurance and the contingent interest of
the beneficiary in the proceeds thereof. By that decision, both interests
are community property; hence, both interests must be disposed of
upon divorce. However, it is generally recognized in most jurisdictions
(indeed, even in Washington7 in cases not involving the community
property aspect of insurance) that the interests of the beneficiary,
where the insured has the power and right to change the beneficiary,
3 As the opinion failed to state any of the facts of the case, they are taken from the
Statement of Facts in the Appellant's Brief, with which respondent agreed.
4 In re Brown's Estate, 124 Wash. 273, 214 Pac. 10 (1923) ; In re Coffey's Estate,
195 Wash. 378, 81 P.2d 283 (1938).
r RCW 26.08.110.
6 46 Wn.2d at 589, 283 P.2d at 121.
7 Seattle Association of Credit Men v. Bank of California, 177 Wash. 130, 20 P2d
972 (1934); Schade v. Western Union Life Insurance Co., 125 Wash. 200, 215 Pac.
521 (1923).
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is incapable of present ownership, being a mere expectancy;' no rights
vest until the death of the insured.' It is also recognized that the death
of the husband terminates the marital community. Hence, at the time
the rights of the beneficiary vest, the community is no more, and the
proceeds, if so taken, can not be community property.
In most states the insured is the present owner of such a policy: he
has the corresponding rights, depending upon the terms of the various
policies, to surrender it for its cash value, to exchange it for a paid-up
policy, to borrow on it, to change the beneficiary, to control the method
of payment to the beneficiary, to receive all dividends earned, to
change it into an endowment policy, etc."0 None of these rights are
held by the beneficiary, who is not a party to the contract and is not
the owner thereof."
It does not follow that because a state is under the community
property system the nature of a life insurance policy is different from
that in other states. The two distinct interests remain, with the quali-
fication that the wife shares with the husband the rights of present
ownership," whether or not she is the designated beneficiary of the
proceeds." Once the insured dies, all rights of present ownership in
the policy cease; all that remains is the right, now vested, of the bene-
ficiary to take the proceeds under the insurance contract. The proper
analysis, where the wife is designated as beneficiary, is that the hus-
band, upon death, has made a gift to the wife of his half of the proceeds,
just as in any other insurance case. 4 If the wife is the designated
beneficiary, she takes the proceeds into her separate estate. This is
effected in Washington by statute," but, indeed, would logically follow
without the benefits of such a statute, as it has in other community
property states," because there is no community which exists when
this right vests.
At the same time, it should be recognized that a substantial com-
8 Merchants' National Bank v. Hubbard, 220 Ala. 372, 125 So. 335 (1929) ; Jacoby v.
Jacoby, 69 S.D. 432, 11 N.W.2d 135 (1943).
9.Jorgenson v. Deviney, 57 N.D. 63, 222 N.V. 464 (1931) ; Baird v. Wainwright,
- Okla.- , 260 P.2d 1060 (1953).
10 Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Clark, 81 Cal. App. 546, 254 Pac. 306 (1927).
". Simmons v. Miller, 171 Cal. 23, 151 Pac. 545 (1915).
12 All community property, both real and personal, is owned by both spouses equally.
Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 Pac. 425 (1930).
13 Cf. In re Towey's Estate, 22 Wn.2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945).
14 In re Lissner, 27 Cal. App.2d 570, 81 P.2d 448 (1938) ; Travelers'Insurance Co. v.
Francher, 219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482 (1933).
"RCW 48.18.410. Cf. In re Killien's Estate, 178 Wash. 335, 35 P.2d 71 (1934).
10 Cf. In re Dobbel's Estate, 104 Cal. 432, 38 Pac. 87 (1894) ; Johnson v. Cole, 258
S.V. 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
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munity investment is often made in life insurance on the life of the
husband, and the wife's interests should be afforded some protection.
This may be accomplished without stretching the concept of property
as the Washington court has done. The owner of a policy, as a normal
incident of ownership, has the control of its disposition. Though the
husband is nominally full owner of the policy, under the Washington
property system the wife is the owner, to the same degree as her
husband, of one-half of the policy, and controls the disposition of that
half. The husband can not give away all the proceeds by changing the
beneficiary without the wife's consent, because he can not dispose of
that which is not his to give away. Any change of beneficiary by him
should be effective, but only as to his half. This, in effect, is the result
of the California decisions.
If this premise is correct, the holding in the Price case is a non-
sequitur. A divorce decree which gives to the husband " all insurance
policies" on his life can not divest the wife of her interest in the pro-
ceeds, because it is not a property right; there is nothing of which she
may be divested, except her share in the present ownership and her
present right to demand protection for her half of the fruits of the
community investment by control of its disposition.'"
For the proposition that the right of the beneficiary is not property
there is ample authority.' "In order to constitute a vested interest, it
is necessary that there be 'an immediate fixed right of either present
or future enjoyment,' and a mere expectancy would not suffice. And
when the power to change the beneficiary is retained by the insured,
the interest of the beneficiary can not be considered either to be vested
or to be a property right, at least until the death of the insured.""0
It is submitted that when a divorce decree sets over to the husband
the policy, it merely makes him full owner. The wife gives up her
17 Bazzell v. Endriss, 41 Cal. App2d 463, 107 P.2d 49 (1940) ; McBride v. McBride,
11 Cal. App. 2d 521, 54 P.2d 480 (1936) ; North West Life Insurance Co. v. Bank of
Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 Pac. 61 (1923).
2" See Jenkins v. Jenkins, 112 Cal. App. 402, 297 Pac. 56, 59 (1931) : "If we concede
that Hilda Jenkins, the plaintiff, lost any and all community right that she may have
bad in the proceeds of the policy by reason of the decree in divorce, it means nothing
more than that her right as a partner in the community to demand a proportionate
share of the proceeds of the policy, regardless of who might be beneficiary, was lost."
19 Where it was contended that the divorce decree cut off the wife's interest, even
though it did not specifically mention the policies, the court replied that as the wife had
no vested interest, there was no occasion for the court to make any order connected
with it; it was nothing that had to be set off to the wife; it belonged to the husband
and he had the power of disposition. Thromp v. National Reserve Life Insurance Co.,
143 Kan. 98, 53 P.2d 831 (1936). Cf. Jorgenson v. De Viney, 57 N.D. 63, 222 N.W.
464 (1931). See also notes 8 and 9 supra.20 2 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 901 (1941).
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community interest in the policy, including her right to demand pro-
tection for one-half of the proceeds for which she has paid, something
separate and distinct from that part of the policy providing for pay-
ment to her as beneficiary, which has now become a revocable designa-
tion as to the whole. The husband may change the beneficiary at will;
he may surrender the policy for its cash value, or do any other act in
regards to it consistent with ownership. His failure to revoke the
beneficiary designation in favor of his former wife should be no dif-
erent in this case than in any other involving the effect of a divorce
upon life insurance."
Certainly, it is well-settled that the interests of a wife who has been
named beneficiary of a life insurance policy on the life of her husband
are not cut off by a divorce." A policy valid at its inception is not
avoided by the cessation of the insurable interest in the beneficiary,
unless such be the necessary effect of the provisions of the policy
itself." This rule is recognized in every American jurisdiction, 4 except
Texas. 5 Thus, it requires something more than a divorce to cut off
the wife's interest in the policy.
That this is the Washington rule" was reaffirmed last year in North
West Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Perrigo." In that case the divorce
decree made no mention of the community's paid-up policy on the
husband's life. This did not mean, however, that the policy was un-
affected by the divorce. The statute requires that all property be
disposed of upon divorce; this may be done by the court's order in the
decree, or by the mere fact of divorce. Community property not in-
cluded within the terms of the decree is held by the members of the
now non-existent community as tenants-in-common. 8 Each as to his
or her half is as much the owner of that half as one of them would be
of the whole, if the decree specifically awarded the entire policy to
either of them, with the qualification that the incidents of tenancy-in-
common attach. But this, again, refers only to the rights of present
21 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P2d 841 (1945).
22 2 APPLEMAN, op cit. supra note 20, at § 804.
23 Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876).
24 Annot., 52 A.L.R. 386 (1928) ; Annot., 175 A.L.R. 1220 (1948).
25 In Texas it is held to be against public policy for a divorced wife to be the bene-
ficiary of her former husband's policy. She loses all "insurable interest" in the husband's
life, and it becomes a mere wagering contract. Cole v. Browning, 187 S.W2d 588 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945); Northwest Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Whiteselle, 188 S.W. 22
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ; Hatch v. Hatch, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 373, 80 S.W. 411 (1904).
26 Teed v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 111 Wash. 367, 190 Pac. 1005 (1920);
Humphrey v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 86 Wash. 672, 151 Pac. 100 (1915).
27147 Wash. Dec. 261, 287 P.2d 334 (1955).
28 Mende v. Mende, 148 Wash. 432, 269 Pac. 494 (1928).
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ownership, including the right to change the beneficiary (as to the
half now owned). The interest of the beneficiary of each half remains
the same, if the designation is not revoked. Upon the husband's death,
if he has failed to so revoke the designation of his former wife, she
should take the whole amount, one-half because she is the owner of
one-half the policy and has the right to control its disposition; one-half
as the beneficiary of her husband's half. This is exactly what the
Washington court held in the Perrigo case.
It is submitted, that, although public policy does not favor leaving a
divorced couple in the position of tenants-in-common as to former
community property," where this situation results, the effect is no
different than where the court has disposed of the policy by decree.
The nature of the present ownership remains the same, whether it is
as to one-half of the policy or its entirety; the nature of the bene-
ficiary's interest remains the same.
The fact that the insurance policy was mentioned in the property
settlement agreement in the Price case does not change this result. As
the beneficiary's interest is only an expectancy, it may only be con-
tracted away by means of an equitable assignment of future rights.
Courts generally refuse to find such an assignment unless this result is
unavoidable, being expressly included in the contract's terms or by
necessary implication,"° the California authorities cited by the Wash-
ington court in the Price case notwithstanding. 1
20 Thompson v. Thompson, 100 Wash. 671, 171 Pac. 1005 (1918).
20 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal2d 173, 157 P2d 841 (1945). It is interesting to notice
that the language of the settlement seemed to cover all possibilities. The Washington
court, in distinguishing this case, made much of the fact that the settlement specifically
gave the husband the right to change the beneficiary, indicating that it was not intended
that this be done by the contract itself. Yet the settlement stated that the wife "transfers,
releases and relinquishes to the first party all interest in and to said policy of insurance
and the premiums paid thereunder and the avails thereof," at p. 844. The case held that
a contract "is an equitable assignment or renunciation of an expectancy only if it
expressly or by necessary implication so provides. General expressions or clauses are
not to be construed as including an assignment of expectancies, and the beneficiary
retains his status if it does not clearly appear that in addition to the segregation of the
property of the spouses, it was intended to deprive either of the right to take the
property under a will or insurance policy ... [Failure of the husband to change the
beneficiary] ordinarily indicates that he did not wish to effect a change so that in effect
his failure to act amounts to a confirmation of the will or the designation of the wife
in the insurance policy," at p. 843.
31 The California cases cited by the Washington court all recognize the general rule
as announced in the Grimm decision, supra note 31, but each is distinguishable from
both the Grimm and Price cases in the comprehensive wording of the agreements. In
Thorp v. Randazzo, 41 Cal. 2d 770, 264 P2d 38 (1953), the settlement stated that the
wife hereby waives "all claims to any benefits that she may have at present, or which
may hereafter be derived from the... life insurance policies...." at p. 39. The same is
true in Mehrin v. Mehrin, 99 Cal. App. 2d 596, 222 P.2d 305 (1950), also cited by the
Washington court. Sullivan v. Union Oil Co. of California, 16 Cal. 2d 229, 105 P.2d
922 (1940) was distinguished from this factual situation by the court in the Grimm
19561
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Nor is this result changed by the additional factor of a merger of the
property settlement agreement in a divorce decree," unless the terms
thereof specifically or by necessary implication include the interest of
the wife as beneficiary." Especially is this so in a community property
state where the wife may give up an interest in the policy (the right of
present ownership in one-half), retain her interest as beneficiary, and
still come within the rather general terms of the decree awarding "all
insurance policies" to the husband. But even in non-community
property states, where the wife has no such interest to give up, and the
words of the decree often become meaningless unless they are taken
to mean her interest as beneficiary, the courts have generally held that
she retains this interest. 4 Indeed, many opinions have declared that
as the beneficiary's interest is not property, nor vested, it can not be
the subject of a disposition of the spouses' property," and that "there
was no occasion for the court to make any order connected with it." 6
The closest case on its facts to the Price case is an Oklahoma de-
cision" in which the decree "set over" to the husband the policy in
question; it ordered that "Plaintiff [wife] should have no interest in
the policy." The husband died only a month after the decree had been
rendered. The court held that the decree vested all present rights in
the contract, including the corollary right to change the beneficiary at
will, in the husband. It "did not attempt to make any disposition of
the proceeds in the event of his death." The opinion raises one further
problem as to a divorce court's power to so dispose of the interests of
the beneficiary. It declared,
Clearly the court could not and did not cancel out Mrs. Mabry as
beneficiary... The court did not, as indeed it could not, disturb the
contractual rights and obligations as between the insuror and the
case. The closest case cited by the court is Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Richard-
son, 27 F.Supp. 791 (W.D. La. 1939), but this case follows Texas law, and Texas is
the only state in the Union wherein the wife can never be beneficiary after a divorce;
see note 25, supra.
32 Parrish v. Kaska, 204 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1953), applying California law. The
decree approved the settlement which stated that the wife "hereby sells, assigns,
transfers and sets over unto the first party as and for his sole and separate property all
her right, title, interest, and estate of, in and to these certain policies of insurance." The
court awarded the proceeds to the wife. Cf. Andrews v. Andrews, 97 F.2d 485 (8th
Cir. 1938).
3 Cf. Mabbitt v. Wilkinson, 220 Ark. 270, 247 S.W.2d 201 (1952).
34 See notes 8 and 9 supra.
35 Mayfield v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 611, 61 P.2d 83 (1936);
Sandrosky v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 217 Cal. 578, 20 P.2d 325 (1933);
Wolf v. Jebe, 242 Wis. 650, 9 N.W.2d 124 (1943).3 1 Thromp v. National Reserve Life Insurance Co., 143 Kan. 98, 53 P.2d at p. 833(1929).
37 Baird v. Wainwright, -Okla.-, 260 P.2d 1060 (1953).
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insured on the one hand, and the obligations under the policy as between
the insured and the beneficiary. Concededly Mrs. Mabry had no interest
in the policy during Dr. Mabry's lifetime, but, as the named beneficiary,
she had a contingent right that accrued into a vested right upon the
death of her former husband.38
It is not the writer's contention that a court cannot dispose of the
wife's future interest as beneficiary, but only that this was not done in
the Price case. Clearly, the court could have done what the parties, by
executing an equitable assignment, could have done. But this must be
accomplished by ordering the wife to assign all her future claims
against the company, or ordering the husband to change the beneficiary.
Perhaps the most practical solution in many cases would be to order
the parties to surrender the policy, and distribute the cash as commu-
nity property." It is difficult to comprehend how the court can order
the insurance company, not a party to the divorce action before it, to
pay a person other than the named beneficiary. The company knows
little about the marital relations of its policy holders. Even if it did,
there is nothing it can do but continue to perform the contract, or to
be ready to perform it, according to its terms. Ambiguity, uncertainty,
and failure to order the parties to act in regards to the designation of
the beneficiary, a common shortcoming in divorce courts' dispositions
of policies, can only result in increased trouble and expense to the
insurance companies." It is suggested that the courts, in determining
all rights to insurance policies, specifically order what shall be done,
rather than invite additions to the already voluminous records of
litigation between claimants.
The Price decision makes it rather difficult for a divorced husband
to leave his former wife as beneficiary of his insurance policies. It is
not infrequent that the affections of spouses for each other may survive
divorce; even if this is not the case, the husband may feel an obligation
towards his former wife to see that she is fully provided for. Be that
as it may, it is not for the court to inquire into the husband's motives.
"All [the court] may assume is that he left the policy where he wanted
it."" This holding actually constitutes a trap for the unwary; if he
wanted his former wife to be the beneficiary, it would be natural for
him to suppose that his intention would be fulfilled if he merely left
38 -Okla. at-, 260 P.2d at 1063.
39 Womack v. Womack, 141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307 (1943).
40 Mooney, Insurance in Divorce Cases: Unsettled Rights Mean Future Litigation, 41
A.B.A.J. 315 (1955).41 ThromD v. National Reserve Life Insurance Co., supra note 36, 53 P.2d at p. 836.
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the designation unchanged (indeed, that this is so is confirmed by the
facts of the principal case). But the court has here held that the mere
mention of "insurance" in the decree automatically cuts off the wife's
future rights; it eliminates her as beneficiary, regardless of the hus-
band's intentions, even though he now has full power of disposition
of the proceeds.
To adopt such a theory would be to hold that policies of life insurance
mean nothing, and by such a holding the usefulness of life insurance
would be at an end and this form of insurance would pass. Such a
holding would necessarily mean that every insurance company would
be restrained from paying out on any life insurance policy until a
decree determining heirship had been entered ... The designation of
beneficiary would mean nothing, and the beneficient objects of life
insurance would be thwarted.4 2
IRWIN L. TREIGER
Interpretation of Omnibus Clause in Auto Liability Insurance. K's policy provided
that "With respect to the insurance policy for bodily injury liability and for property
damage liability the unqualified word 'Insured' includes... (1) any person while
using an automobile owned by the Named Insured... provided that the actual use is
with the permission of the Named Insured." He loaned his car to J, a fellow soldier at
Fort Lewis, to "go to Tacoma." After a short stay in Tacoma, J proceeded to Seattle,
and was involved in a collision, injuring plaintiff, seventeen miles north of Tacoma.
Plaintiff seeks to recover from the insurer, claiming that J was an additional insured
under the quoted clause. Held: judgment for plaintiff. The court, recognizing a three-
way split of authority, found that the deviation from the granted permission was not
material. "As regards the breadth to be given the word 'permission', as used in a
clause of the character herein considered-where one asks for and receives pcrinission
to use the car for a purpose indicated by him in his request, it will not be held that any
deviation or departure from that purpose so indicated by him annuls the permission and
puts him in the position of unlawfully using the car." Wallin v. Knudtson, 46 Wn.2d
80, 83, 278 P2d 344, 346 (1955).
This was the first occasion in which the Washington court has been squarely faced
with the problem. Two other cases, Yurick v. McElroy, 32 Wn.2d 511, 202 P.2d 464
(1949) and Cypert v. Roberts 169 Wash. 33, 13 P.2d 55 (1932), have dealt with the
problem, but in neither of them could the driver come within the omnibus clause under
any view, and the court deferred judgment on which view to adopt. There are two
positions in addition to that taken by the Washington court: the strict conversion
rule, that actual permission for the particular use is necessary (greatly modified by
findings of "implied permission" in many cases) ; and the liberal rule, that "permission"
means only consent to take or use the car in the first instance. Both the latter rule
and the more flexible middle stand taken by the Washington court are consistent with
the familiar rule that where clauses in an insurance policy are ambiguous, or
susceptible of two interpretations differing in import, that interpretation which will
sustain the claim of the policy-holder and cover the loss should be adopted. The
Washington rule also seems more consistent with the risks actually contemplated by
42 Jenkins v. Jenkins, supra note 18, 297 Pac. at p. 60.
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the insurer (those of accidents while a car is being driven by another than the named
insured, whether it is driven for ten blocks or ten miles) and the intentions of the
named insured. It does, however, present much more serious problems of application
than either of the other rules. Where the line is to be drawn between a material and
an immaterial deviation is sure to plague the courts in years to come. See the excellent
discussions of the problem in notes, 72 A.L.R. 1375 (1931) and 6 A.L.R. 2d 600 (1949).
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Bills and Notes-Corporate Endorsement. In the case of Glaser
v. Connell,' plaintiff sued on a promissory note claiming to be a holder
in due course, alleging that the payee had endorsed the note. The
defendant was the maker of the note and denied that the note was
validly endorsed and alleged that the payee had secured the note by
fraudulent means. The note in question was made payable to the
order of the "Holdorf Oyster Corporation." The inscription on the
back of the instrument, which the plaintiff alleged constituted the
endorsement of the payee, was as follows:
"Pres. Dwight Holdorf"
"Sec. Opal Holdorf"
The trial court found that the payee had not endorsed the note and
that the plaintiff had no standing to sue thereon, and the action was
dismissed. On appeal the judgment was affirmed. The supreme court
held that since the name of the payee did not appear on the back of the
instrument the purported endorsement was defective and the plaintiff
could not possibly be a holder in due course.
The vital issue in the case was whether or not the note was endorsed
by the payee. In the pleadings, the plaintiff had alleged that he was a
holder in due course, thus to recover he had to prove that the note
was endorsed by the payee.'
There are a number of older cases, decided prior to the enactment
of the N.I.L., holding that the payee's name need not appear in the
endorsement.' The rule of these older cases is succinctly stated in 8 C.J.,
Bills & Notes § 312 as follows: "Bills and notes may be transferred by
an agent of the owner by an endorsement in his individual name
1 147 Wash. Dec. 559, 289 P.2d 364 (1955).
2 Willett v. Central Yakima Ranches Co., 126 Wash. 587, 219 Pac. 20 (1923).
3 McIntire v. Preston, 10 Ill. 48 (1848) (note payable to "Ocean Insurance Com-
pany" and inscribed on the back "Without recourse, Joel Scott, Sec'y." was held to be
validly endorsed) ; Merchants' Bank v. McCall, 19 N.Y. Super. 473 (1860) (note pay-
able to order of "Globe Insurance Company" and inscribed on the back "L. Gregory,
Pres't., Jas. W. Elwell & Co." was held to be validly endorsed) ; Clark v. Titcomb,
42 Barb (N.Y.) 122 (1864) (note payable to order of "Commercial Mutual Maine
Insurance Company of Massachusetts" and inscribed on the back "George H. Folger,
President" was held to be validly endorsed).
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